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RonaldA. Brand*
Response to: ChristopherA. Whytock & CassandraBurke
Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1444 (2011)
INTRODUCTION

"As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United
States."i Lord Denning was not the only person outside the United States
to believe that litigation in U.S. courts is a gold mine with no risk of failure
for plaintiffs. Now, Professors Whytock and Robertson, in Forum Non
Conveniens and the Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, tell us that we need
doctrinal restructuring that will change rules that are too pro-defendant.2
Has the pendulum swung that far?
In their Article, Whytock and Robertson provide a wonderful ride
through the landscape of the law of both forum non conveniens and

* Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor and Director, Center for
International Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (A.C.) at 733 (Eng.).
Lord Denning goes on to elaborate:
If [the plaintiff] can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At
no cost to himself; and at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side. The
lawyers there will conduct the case "on spec" as we say, or on a "contingency fee" as
they say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for their services but instead
they will take 40 per cent. of the damages, if they win the case in court, or out of
court on a settlement. If they lose, the litigant will have nothing to pay to the other
side. The courts in the United States have no such costs deterrent as we have. There
is also in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are prone to award fabulous
damages. They are notoriously sympathetic and know that the lawyers will take
their 40 per cent. before the plaintiff gets anything. All this means that the
defendant can be readily forced into a settlement. The plaintiff holds all the cards.
Id. at 733-34.
2. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and
the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1444, 1449-50 (2011) ("If the
forum non conveniens doctrine is applied to deny the plaintiff court access in the United
States and, in the same dispute, the judgment enforcement doctrine is applied to deny the
plaintiff a remedy based on a foreign judgment, the plaintiff may be denied meaningful
access to justice.").
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judgment recognition and enforcement. They explain doctrinal
development and current case law clearly and efficiently, in a manner that
educates but does not overburden the reader. Based upon that
explanation, they then analyze both areas of law and offer suggestions for
change. Those suggestions, they tell us, are necessary to close the
"transnational access-to-justice gap" that results from apparent
differences between rules applied in a forum non conveniens analysis and
rules applied to the question of recognition of foreign judgments.3
Whytock and Robertson's Article is worthwhile reading for any
lawyer interested in the evolution of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
and the law of recognition and enforcement of judgments. Recent
developments, such as the Chevron/Ecuador litigation,4 have highlighted
what can happen when a case is (1) filed in a court in the United States, (2)
dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens, (3) refiled in a foreign
court in which judgment is granted, and (4) returned to the United States
in the form of a request for recognition and enforcement of that foreign
judgment. Claims that the foreign court was the more appropriate forum
for litigation of the dispute turn into claims that the foreign court has
denied fundamental rights and that the resulting judgment should be
denied effect in the United States.
It is easy to respond to such cases by seeing a "gap" in the plaintiffs'
access to justice. After all, must not every right (even a right determined
by a foreign court) be followed by a remedy (even if remedy is available
only in a U.S. court because the assets are here)?5 But Whytock and
Robertson do not take this easy approach in their analysis. They raise
legitimate and well-reasoned concerns about the interplay of the law of
forum non conveniens and the recognition and enforcement of judgments.
They also respond to other commentators who have taken differing
positions. And they suggest specific solutions designed to close the
"access-to-justice gap." This response points to two issues that the
otherwise thorough and well-argued Article fails to adequately address.
First, the Article's foundational assumptions omit a key distinction
between jurisdiction under U.S. law and under the law of other countries.
Second, the rationale behind Whytock and Robertson's solution does not
sufficiently consider how it might exacerbate imbalances in jurisdictional
rules across international borders.

3. Id. at 1450.
4. See id. at 1447-48 & nn.8-12 (discussing series of cases in Chevron/Ecuador
litigation applying U.S. forum non conveniens doctrine (citing Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd as modified, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002) and Aquinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d
153 (2d Cir. 1998))).
5. Id. at 1448 n.189 and accompanying text (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), for rule that "for every violation of a right, there must be a
remedy").
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I. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS

At the core of the Whytock and Robertson thesis is the conclusion,
based on the analysis found in Part II of their Article, that there exists a
"transnational access-to-justice gap."6 Like other such assumptions, what
one observes depends on one's vantage point. The language used by
Whytock and Robertson is itself significant from a comparative law
perspective, and suggests reason for further examination of their analysis.
While the Article provides a good historical review of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, including reference to recent cases that intersect
with questions of judgment recognition, like most articles on these
matters, it does not acknowledge how other legal systems deal with the
problems addressed by the two doctrines it describes. Forum non
conveniens is one approach to the problem of parallel litigation that arises
when the courts of more than one state have jurisdiction to decide a
matter.7 If only one court had jurisdiction over every case, such problems
would not occur. But that would require a single rule of jurisdiction (such
as "all defendants may be sued only in the courts of the defendant's state
of habitual residence"), and most legal systems have both rules of general
jurisdiction (allowing suit to be brought where the defendant is-often
defined as the defendant's state of domicile) and rules of specific or special
jurisdiction (allowing suit to be brought in courts other than the
defendant's home court).8 The major difference between the United States
and other countries (particularly civil law countries) on jurisdictional
analysis comes in how courts conceptualize jurisdiction itself.
In the United States, the jurisdictional question has been, since
Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877,9 a constitutional matter based on the right of a
defendant to "due process of law" in any question involving life, liberty, or
property (i.e., any question that arises in litigation). Thus, the analysis of
jurisdiction depends on the due process rights of the defendant, and
requires a three-way nexus among the court, the defendant, and the claim.
In civil law countries, questions of jurisdiction are not so much
questions of a defendant's rights as they are questions of what court is
"competent" to hear the case. Thus, for example, the rules of special
jurisdiction found in the Brussels I Regulation of the European Union rely

6. Id. at 1450.
7. For discussion of related doctrines in civil law systems, see Ronald A. Brand & Scott
R. Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History, Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 101-19 (2007).
8. For a comparison of U.S. and European approaches to jurisdictional analysis, see
Ronald A. Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U.Pitt. L.
Rev. 661, 664-701 (1999) [hereinafter Brand, Due Process].
9. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "Rightly or wrongly, Pennoyer v. Neff linked American
jurisdictional law with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and however
questionable that linkage may be, it has become part of American conventional wisdom."
Friedrich K.Juenger, Constitutionalizing German Jurisdictional Law, 44 Am. J.Comp. L. 521,
521 (1996) (book review).
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on a two-way nexus between the court and the claim.10 The resulting rules
allow jurisdiction that would be held to violate due process in the United
States.11
The result of this distinction between the United States and the rest of
the world is that the United States focuses on the due process rights of the
defendant, while the rest of the world focuses on access to justice-the
plaintiffs right to have his or her day in court.12 The former is a clear
defendant-protection approach, and the latter is a clear plaintiffprotection approach. The difference is fundamental, but it is more than
that. It also draws into question a substantial part of the basis for Lord
Denning's view of the U.S. judicial system. With Denning's own country
now firmly ensconced in the legal realm of the European Union, including
its rules of jurisdiction, at least in this part of the law the
civilian/European approach is much more plaintiff-friendly than that of
the United States. By using the civil law "access-to-justice" terminology,
Whytock and Robertson risk transplanting one system of analysis of the
exercise of judicial jurisdiction into another, without acknowledging
fundamental differences of approach. The U.S. system of jurisdiction is
defendant-friendly precisely because our Supreme Court has made
jurisdiction a constitutional issue based on the due process "rights" of the
defendant.13 Any analysis of rules that affect that exercise of jurisdiction
in U.S. courts must begin (and end) with that reality. While a plaintiffs
access-to-justice interest is important, it is the defendant's right to due
process that is enshrined in our Constitution as it has been interpreted to
apply to jurisdictional analysis.
II. RATIONALE FOR SOLUTION

There is a second comparative law distinction that is relevant in any

10. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5, 2001 O.J.
(L 12) 1, 4 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation] (establishing special jurisdiction rules
based on claim-court nexus), amended by Commission Regulation 1496/2002 of 21 August
2002, 2002 0.J. (L 225) 13 (EC).
11. See, e.g., Brand, Due Process, supra note 8, at 689-701 (describing several
jurisdictional rules in civil law countries that violate due process).
12. See, e.g., Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, at 3, COM (2010) 748 final (Dec. 14, 2010) [hereinafter Regulation Proposal]
("Access to justice in the EU is overall unsatisfactory in disputes involving defendants from
outside the EU.").
13. This aspect of U.S. jurisprudence was extended further in the most recent Supreme
Court decisions on jurisdiction. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.
Ct. 2846, 2852, 2857 (2011) (holding North Carolina courts did not have jurisdiction over
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent corporation based on fact that small percentage of tires
manufactured by subsidiaries were distributed in North Carolina by other U.S. affiliates); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011) (finding manufacturing
company could not be sued in New Jersey, although it had agreed to sell machines in United
States, attended trade shows in several other states, and sold four machines that ended up
in New Jersey, as it had not "engaged in any conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey").
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discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, one that is directly
related to the question of parallel litigation and how we treat the
possibility of multiple potential forums for a single dispute. The doctrine
of forum non conveniens, developed in common law jurisdictions, favors
equitable analysis over efficient rules and gives courts discretion in
determining the most appropriate forum for a dispute.14 By contrast, civil
law states generally address the "problem" of parallel litigation through
predictable rules found in code-type instruments. The ordinary rule is the
concept of lis alibi pendens, by which the first court seised retains
jurisdiction and all subsequent courts in which an action involving the
same issues and parties is brought dismiss the case.15
Neither approach to parallel litigation is wholly satisfactory. The civil
law approach (lis pendens) favors efficiency and predictability (values
focused on societal interests) over equity and fairness (values focused on
individual interests). The result is a race to the courthouse that can
interrupt (and perhaps prevent) rational negotiated resolution of disputes
before tensions are raised by formal legal proceedings. The common law
approach (forum non conveniens) requires that courts be given discretion
(something disfavored in civil law systems) and brings with it significant
uncertainty.
If we are to properly consider the intersection of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and the law applicable to foreign judgment
recognition, we must take into account more than just our own legal
system. We must also consider the legal systems in countries whose courts
may receive cases dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens and
generate judgments for which recognition may be requested. This
requires an understanding of the fundamental choice made at the outset in

14. See generally, Brand & Jablonski, supra note 7, at 1-100 (presenting current status
of common law forum non conveniens doctrine in United Kingdom, United States, Canada,
and Australia).
15. Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation states this concept:
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than
the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as
the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.
Brussels I Regulation, supra note 10, art. 27. In the European Commission's proposed recast
of the Brussels I Regulation, because the jurisdictional rules would apply to defendants
domiciled outside the EU as well, there has been added in Article 34(1) the following
language to modify the lis pendens rule when the other court is outside the EU:
1. Notwithstanding the rules in Articles 3 to 7, if proceedings in relation to the same
cause of action and between the same parties are pending before the courts of a
third State at a time when a court in a Member State is seised, that court may stay its
proceedings if:
(a) the court of the third State was seised first in time;
(b) it may be expected that the court in the third State will, within a reasonable
time, render a judgment that will be capable of recognition and, where applicable,
enforcement in that Member State; and
(c) the court is satisfied that it is necessary for the proper administration of justice
to do so.
Regulation Proposal, supra note 12, at 3.
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approaches to the questions of jurisdiction and parallel proceedings. In
the Whytock and Robertson analysis, this means that we should start with
the understanding that forum non conveniens is not the only game in
town, and that other legal systems (with the exception of a few common
law systems) do not defer either to foreign courts or to defendants
(domestic or foreign) in the same manner as do U.S. courts. This difference
in legal systems must also be considered when we turn to the "end game"
of recognition of judgments coming from those foreign courts.
U.S. courts traditionally have been much more liberal in recognizing
foreign judgments than courts in other legal systems, particularly those in
civil law countries that require near relitigation of the case if no treaty
creates reciprocal rights of recognition.16 Because the United States still
has no such treaty with any other country, this is a significant matter.
Whytock and Robertson suggest that, once the adequacy
determination is made at the forum non conveniens, it need not be made
again at the recognition and enforcement stage (with limited exceptions).
This creates two problems, one of analysis and one of global-political
reality.
First, the Whytock and Robertson analysis fails adequately to
acknowledge that the two stages involve two separate and different
determinations. What is appropriate in determining the most appropriate
forum for the initial trial in the case is one matter. What is appropriate in
determining whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, that forum's
decision should be given full faith and credit is something very different.
Second, Whytock and Robertson, in arguing for the application of
forum non conveniens standards of deference to foreign courts at the
stage of recognition and enforcement of judgments, advocate the type of
unilateral concession that hampered the U.S. delegation at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law when, in the 1990s, efforts were
made to negotiate a global convention on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments.17 The facts are that only a few other
common law legal systems grant that type of deference to foreign courts at
the jurisdiction stage of litigation, and even fewer grant such deference to
foreign courts on the question of the recognition of judgments. While it
may seem coherent in a vacuum that assumes legal perfection to unify
rules on deference to foreign courts at the jurisdiction and the judgment
recognition stages, it simply is not consistent with reality, and would
16. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971) ("Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect."). See generally, Ronald
A. Brand, Enforcing Foreign Judgments in the United States and United States Judgments
Abroad (1992) (providing primer on enforcing foreign judgments in United States,
obtaining judgments enforceable abroad, and enforcing U.S. judgments abroad).
17. Cf. Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on
Jurisdiction and Judgments: A View from the United States, in The Hague Preliminary Draft
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments 3, 11-12 (Fausto Pocar & Constanza Honorati
eds., 2005) (describing role of U.S. "unilateral disarmament" on judgment recognition in
failure of negotiations).
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create free-rider problems that would likely hamper the United States in
any future negotiation of conventions related to issues of jurisdiction and
the recognition of judgments. Any argument to make U.S. judgment
recognition rules more liberal than they already are faces real problems of
international balance. Simply acknowledging that U.S. courts are more
likely than their foreign counterparts to defer to foreign courts at the
jurisdiction stage does not, in itself, justify making U.S. courts more likely
than their foreign counterparts to defer to foreign courts when receiving
the results of foreign litigation.
FINAL COMMENTS

Whytock and Robertson claim that the U.S. legal system, through
doctrines related to jurisdiction (forum non conveniens) and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments, errs on the side of favoring
defendants in civil actions. This runs counter to common assumptions
made about the U.S. legal system by persons outside the United States.
While the analysis is clear, and nicely supported, it is open to a challenge
based on a comparative analysis of legal systems' approaches to
jurisdiction and parallel proceedings.
By beginning with the assumption of an "access-to-justice gap,"
Whytock and Robertson fail to acknowledge that jurisdictional rules in the
United States are ultimately based not on access-to-justice (as is the case
in most of the civil law world), but rather on protecting the due process
rights of the defendant. Moreover, courts in the United States apply
different tests in cases that defer to foreign courts on the basis of forum
non conveniens than they do in cases that refuse recognition of the
resulting judgment when a defendant demonstrates bases for
nonrecognition grounded in the specific events of the specific case. In
doing so, those decisions are wholly consistent with the constitutional
underpinnings of U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence, the manner in which
U.S. courts treat the problem of parallel available forums, and the
approach of other countries to the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments. While the change in the direction offered by Whytock and
Robertson may be justifiable internally, it would further unbalance
jurisdiction and judgment recognition in an already tilted global system.

Preferred Citation: Ronald A. Brand, Access-to-JusticeAnalysis on a Due Process
Platform,
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